EJ – Looking at the international scene from both an American and a European viewpoint, the main reason of unease is clearly Iraq, and the main cause of preoccupation is obviously Iran.
Today, the dissent of Europe on the first of these two crises is no longer stressed, and barely mentioned in diplomatic circles, but the scepticism expressed at the time by France and Germany on the wisdom of the war seems to have been vindicated. Three years have gone since the invasion, and the hopes of a quick victory that would bring stability to the country have not come true. The occupation goes on, and so does the rebellion.
Don’t you agree with the opinion that the price paid by both the Iraqi people and the occupying forces is becoming unbearable?

Edward Luttwak – I could agree with your point, and share your analysis if it WERE not for a preliminary point. A basic fact has to be established before any discussion about the Iraqi issue. And that is that the Americans defeated Saddam Hussein, but they did not really occupy Iraq.

There is no occupation. American and coalition forces have criss-crossed Mesopotamia in all possible directions, but at no time did they hold more than a fraction of the territory of Iraq, and they do not hold any at present, except for parts of a few cities and some isolated bases. But that’s all. In most of Iraq there is no permanent control by western forces; and there cannot be. The total number of US troops that we have sent to fight this war is clearly insufficient, indeed it is ridiculously small for the task of occupying such a large country.

EJ – Still they are present enough to inflict heavy casualties to the civilian population. And this has not been “collateral damage”. There have been unnecessary brutality, and cases of war crimes, at first denounced by the US and international media, and eventually confirmed and confessed by US top brass, and even by American political authorities.
In a way, for these victims and for these excesses in the use of force, you can blame the very fact that there are insufficient western forces on the ground. I will grant you this point. After the idiotic disbandment of the Iraqi armed forces, few young men with military training had to perform police duties in a very difficult political and religeous environment.
The excessive and improper use of firearms is inevitable in situation like this. One does not want to justify either the patent violations of the military code of conduct, nor – even less – openly criminal behaviour, or even torture. But all those things are bound to happen when a military force untrained in police duties feels surrounded by a hostile population.

Edward Luttwak – I imagine that you realize that all that you just said does not contradict, and actually strengthens my point: western troops in Iraq are grossly insufficient to control the territory and enforce law and order.
I’ve visited Iraq several times: it is quite impressive how there are no US soldiers around. Iraq is a big country, with a very small number of soldiers. The number of American soldiers in Iraq has, at all times, been lower than the number of policemen in Italy.
In New York City alone there is a municipal police force of 37,500 men; the number of combat soldiers who entered in Iraq (I’m not talking about logistic support and headquarter elements) had never been over 60,000, and the Iraqi population is much larger and more hostile than the New York population, and speaks languages that – to use an English understatement – aren’t well known by American soldiers.

EJ – In synthesis, your point is that American soldiers have conquered in Iraq, but have never occupied it. The country has been invaded , local forces have been defeated, disorganized and dispersed, but have never been adequately replaced.
But let me add that, from what you say, there is only one possible conclusion to be drawn; that the entire effort was flawed from the outset, that there has been a major strategic error in the conduct of operations.

Edward Luttwak – It is too early to draw military and strategic lessons from the Iraqi experience. But it is not too early to say that it has been a strategic mistake, to invade Iraq that way. And it was obvious from the outset that the US administration was committing a tragic error.

During the last 40 years I have supported all our wars, and I do not repent of having done so, and at present I think that the West should not rule out the military option against the Iranian nuclear program, but I was against the war in Iraq. Because we did not have the right numbers. If someone would have told me: ‘let’s go to Iraq, defeat Saddam’s regime and come back’, I might have answered ‘good, let’s do it!’, but I did not personally see the urgency.

When I discovered that they wanted to invade Iraq, I was working for the Government, not as a Bush adviser, but in a humble tactical capacity for the Marine Corps. I asked myself where the troops would come from: we had a total of 760,000 in the US Army and 210,000 in the Marine Corps, and we would have needed all of them to have 400,000 men in Iraq with as many in support, with nothing at all left for the rest of the world, including actually existing garrisons from Korea to Bosnia .

The objective of establishing an Iraqi democracy moreover was and is mission impossible. Iraqi political cultures are the obstacle Shi’ites mostly follow their religious leaders like sheep, and those leaders are extremely ignorant. The Sunnis oppose majority rule in principle, and the Kurds are very nice but still mostly tribal. The democracy program does not just
need more troops, it needs three hundred years. And such an occupation should be carried out seriously, with something like one million soldiers. We have never had the right numbers.

EJ – Three hundred years of occupation? That’s quite a long time. You certainly plan very far into the future! However, even if you also look the other way, you end up in a past when no such a thing as the US existed, not even as an idea. But I presume you will tell that Mesopotamia was there, and had been for about ten times that long. And that the people, their mentality and way of life have changed very slowly. So, three hundred years of occupation is not that long by Mesopotamian standard. And such an occupation should be carried out seriously, with something like one million soldiers.

Edward Luttwak – That I was one of the first who took a stand against the Iraq war does not mean that I was particularly farsighted or wise. All the experts–all who know Iraq, and almost all of those who had visited the Middle East once or twice were against this war– or at least a war conducted with so small a force with such an ambitious goal.

For example, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Ken Shinseki consulted by the Congress before the war, had estimated that several hundred thousand troops would be needed . He was contradicted, overruled by the civilians above
him, and his tour was not extended.

So, it was not an error by the military commanders. So whose error was it? As you now, while victory has many fathers, defeat is always an orphan.
This seems frankly too simple. Somebody must have taken the decisions that led to the war.